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BREAKING THE SHACKLES
OF THE GREAT CHAIN OF
BEING AND LIBERATING
COMPASSION IN THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
Katherine Kerestman

Sighteenth-century writers, such as Samuel Richardson
jand Samuel Johnson, attacked not specific social evils so
fmuch as the root of all social evils: subordination. A
new interest in perspective encouraged writers and readers to
consider people in all social ranks from their own points of
view, rather than from an all-encompassing "divine" perspective,
and writers began to question the justifications of the hierarchi
cal nature of society—even such statmch defenders of the
establishment as Richardson and Johnson evinced a new
uncertainty about the philosophical basis of hierarchy. One of
the fiirst casualties was the Great Chain of Being, from which
one's downward gaze was directed upon the classes or species
upon whose misery the weight of superior beings rested. When
the chains were smashed, the middle class began to sense that its
legitimacy was not dependant upon its serviceabdity to the
aristocracy, whose "superiority" was doubtful anyway.
57
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Similarly, the lower classes, women, and animals were to gain
champions among the literary intelligentsia, who advocated
humane social principles based upon compassion.
This essay will examine the way in which cruelty to animals
functions as a measure of human depravity and exposes the
sadistic basis of the notion of hierarchy, in selected works of
Richardson and Johnson. Animal imagery, although perhaps
employed with strictly artistic intentions, serves to tmdermine
both writers' well-known championship of a compassionate and
well-intended exercise of power in a hierarchical world order.
Animal references raise doubts about the qualified advocacy of
hierarchy by showing that the notions of superiority and
inferiority serve both to inflame and to sanction human
tendencies toward cruelty and self-importance, cruelty and selfimportance justifying each other in a vicious cycle of increasing
depravity that leaves no room for noblesse oblige. In Clarissa,
Richardson demonstrates the flimsy nature of Lovelace's
justification of his sadistic exercise of power by employing
metaphors of the torment of animals by himters and birdcatchers to comment upon Lovelace's torment of the heroine.
Johnson, in his review of Soame Jenyns's "A Free Inquiry in to
the Nature and Origin of Evil," uses imagery of vivisection to
the same end, showing that the same hardness of heart
exemplified by Lovelace results from a life view based on
hierarchy, which Johnson tmveils as "indulging the lust of
dominion, and that malevolence which delights in seeing others
depressed," rather than any discernable inherent superiority.^
These writers are wielders of the axe with which writers of
conscience were to fell "a system [which] has been raised [and]
is so ready to tell the praises of itself that no great praise can be
derived from its destruction" (543).
' Samud Johnson, Review of "A Free Inquiry into the Nature and Origin of
Evil," by Soame Jenyns, in Samuel Johnson, ed. Donald Greene (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1984): 522-43, 529. Future references are made parenthetically
in the text.
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Both of these writers equate cruelty with pride in rank and
the exercise of power that is the perquisite of rank. By means
of imagery comparing human relations with each other to
human relations with animals, they demonstrate in these works
that hierarchy is the origin of evil, even as it claims to be the
fotmdation of social welfare, and that oppression justified by
hierarchy results in tremendous suffering—rape and poverty.
Richardson highlights his villain's preoccupation with rank
and power through his repeated use of hunting and trapping
metaphors for Lovelace's persecution of Clarissa. Lovelace
writes Belfard, "Will yet not now all join to say it is more
manly to attack a Hon than a sheepi*—Thou knowest that I
always illustrated my eagleship by aiming at the noblest
quarries; and by disdaining to stoop at wrens, phil-iixs, and
wagtails."^ Here the hrmter's choice of victim is seen as an
indication of the rank of the htmter: Clarissa ranks high among
the classes of potential victims, and therefore Lovelace gains
prestige by marking her for his prey.
Penelope Biggs writes that the himt metaphor functions to
ennoble a sadistic way of life; it "focuses attention on the effort
and skill of the pursuer, who is glorified by success; and
suppresses the suffering and potential death of the pursued, for
the 'quarry' is after all not human.She continues that
Lovelace's use of cHches prevents thinking on the part of some
of his readers:
The rake is a bvilly, but is not seen as one—and does not
see himself as one. Through the image of the h;mt,
among others, he is able to "cut a figure" and present
himself as an achiever. The cliches of the "himt" and the
"difficulties of the chase" are thought-deadeners, as long as
they remain chches...We see how far into actual delusion
^ Samud Richardson, Clarissa (London: The Foho Society, 1991), 1:559. Future
references are made parenthetically in the text.
' Pendope B%gs, "Hunt, Conquest, Trial: Lovdace and the Metaphors of the
Rake," Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture 20 (1982): 52.
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the rake is prepared to advance in order to make a shabby
course of action sotmd glorious/

Although Biggs admirably tmveils the impHcations of Lovelace's
cliches regarding the rake's hcense with respect to womankind,
she does not examine their implications regarding humankind's
license with animals. Harriet Ritvo, however, does investigate
the human tendency to order hierarchically the animal
"kingdom," a tendency established by the end of the eighteenth
century and further refined throughout the nineteenth, taken
for granted by Lovelace and tmderlying his remark about
"noblest quarries." Ritvo explains that how people rank
animals reveals what people value:
Throughout the nineteenth century naturahsts debated
the rival claims of cats and dogs to be top animals in
terms that made it clear that the issue was not simply
taxonomical. In question was the more fundamental prin
ciple of whether animals should be ranked according to
their utiUty to humankind, as literal servants or as
instructive analogues, or according to some other
standard.^
Lovelace makes clear that gastronomical pleasure is not his
standard for measuring "utility to humankind": "Does not the
keen fox htmter endanger his neck and bones in pursuit of a
vermin which, when killed is neither fit food for man nor
' Biggs, 53.
^ Harriet Ritvo, The Animal Estate: The English and Other Creatures in the
Victorian Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), 35. Ritvo writes that
eighteenth-century children's literature encouraged humane treatment of animals
for the purpose of inculcating kindness in its readers: "The complex relationship
between sympathetic concern for animals and manipulation of people was clearly
expressed in the only genre of eighteenth-century literature that focused repeatedly
on humane issues...Animals were quickly recognized as promising didactic
instruments, and works of both juvenile natural history and moral fiaion were
loaded with uplifting messages about the need to treat them kindly" (131).
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dogs?" (1:558). Lovelace's standard accords utility to whomever
he can exploit, and his attitude toward hiunans of lesser rank
parallels his attitude toward non-human animals. Consider his
treatment of Clarissa's merchant landlords at the end when she
has finally escaped him: Lovelace lords his aristocratic privilege
over them and violates their shop because he carmot violate
Clarissa. He has no such frustration to serve as his provocation
at the beginning for his gratuitous intimidation of Rosebud's
family; he simply sees the necessity of subordination in every
relationship among individuals: "in every friendship, whether
male or female, there must be a man and a woman spirit (that
is to say, one of them a forbearing one) to make it permanent"
(2:864). He delights in extolling the transcendence of the
human male over the female, as much as he does the aristocracy
over the middle class: "Women, Jack, tacitly acknowledge the
inferiority of their own sex in the pride they take to behold a
kneeling lover at their feet" (1:796). He is so intoxicated by his
exercise of power that he experiences delusions of grandeur:
I shall be as unhappy after a while, from my reflections
upon this conquest, as Don John of Austria was in his,
on the renowned victory of Lapanto, when he fotmd that
none of his future achievements could keep pace with his
early glory. (1:559)
Thus, Richardson's himting and trapping metaphors relate the
oppression of women, nations, and animals to the notion of
hierarchy and the gratification of the exercise of power
conferred by rank, an exercise of power itself necessary to the
maintenance of rank.
Although in his Preface to the 1759 edition of Clarissa
Richardson wrote that one of his purposes was "to caution
parents against the tmdue exertion of their natural authority
over their children" (1:36) both the plot and the animal
metaphors of the novel demonstrate that the question is not the
difference between due and undue exertion of authority, but
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whether good exercise of authority represents a contradiction
of terms. All major characters but Clarissa seek power in
human relationships, while she seeks only autonomy; Lovelace
represents the rule, rather than the exception.^
"Whether aristocratic or middle class, authority is cruel.
Lovelace, Mr. Harlowe, James, and all who possess power enjoy
striking terror into the hearts of their subjects. Morden, for
example, the best of the Harlowe men, and bearing a name
suggestive of death, kills Lovelace in a duel, despite Clarissa's
request that he forbear revenge in order to allow Lovelace time
to repent and escape damnation: Morden employs his authority
to exercise jtxstice without mercy and sends a sotd to hell.
Furthermore, the exercise of power in all heterosexual relations
in the novel (until Clarissa's conversion of Belford^, from that
between Mr. and Mrs. Harlowe to that of Lovelace and
Rosebud, is characterized by obligation, submission, and
' Lovdace desires to control Clarissa's body, miad, and sotd (he thinks them all
one) and to put James in his place, primarily to demonstrate and achieve
acknowledgment of his power by his victims and by society at large. Mr. Harlowe
wants Solmes's monqr, James's advancement, and acknowledgment of his supreme
power in the household. Mrs. Harlowe wants peace at any price, to please her
husband, and Clarissa's happiness (in this order). James wants to best Lovdace, to
get a title, to oppress the women in his family, and to be the father of it. Bdla
wants to best Clarissa and to get back at Lovdace. Anna wants Clarissa's
happiness and personal freedom, dignity, and equality in her rdationships.
Hickman wants Anna and conventional marriage. Bdford wants first to befriend
Lovdace and then to befriend Clarissa, as both are his mentors. AH these desire
power through human rdationships. Clarissa, alone of the characters, wants
something that transcends human social rdationships—to do right in the eyes of
God; but she has been taught that this goal is achieved by submission to patriarchal
authority. While the figures of authority try to prevent her from doing what she
bdieves is right, Clarissa struggles for the autonomy necessary to aa according to
her conscience.
^ Bdford marries into Lovdace's family and may make a good husband, but
heretofore he has been a weak charaaer, influenced first by the stronger, licentious
spirit of Lovdace, and later by the virtuous strength of Clarissa's soul. Can he
remain good without Clarissa's guidance? One might recall Everard Grandison,
cousin of Sir Charles Grandison, a reformed rake who returns to his former
immoral habits as soon as he is out of Sir Charles's s:^ht.
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coercion. Anna Howe echoes Lovelace's words when she
explains how her friends have coerced her into submitting to
her marriage, to a kind man very unlike Lovelace, despite her
fears of "wedded warfare," which she assumes will necessarily
accompany all husbandly attempts to control her: "But there
must be bear and forbear, methinks some wise body will tell
me" (2:1457). The affinity between "some wise body's" words
and those of Lovelace suggests that the patriarchal hierarchy has
an agenda as dehixmanizing and malevolent as that of Lovelace.
To exercise fatherly, husbandly, or aristocratic privilege in
Clarissa is to be cmel, even despite one's intentions.
Angus Wilson has identified power as the villain of the
novel:
In the battle between Clarissa and Lovelace, we go ever
deeper through a beautifully realized fight between two
particular individuals: through the social conflict between
the Harlowes' bourgeois acquisitive Puritanism and
Lovelace's aristocratic, extravagant, arbitrary will; even
through the age-long battle between the sexes...For
Clarissa is finally a novel about the refusal of one human
being (the heroine) to be treated as a thing by another
(her pursuer, Lovelace). It is, I think, the most complete
and powerful accotmt of that terrible battle against power
to be fotmd in literature.®
He sees the power struggle between Lovelace and Clarissa as
emblematic of larger power struggles among classes. Richard
son's use of htmting imagery, however, points beyond the
questions raised about humanity's exertion of power over
oppressed peoples to human oppression of other species.
Philosophers have long been making this same comparison in
' Angus W2son, introduction, Clarissa, by Samuel Richardson (London: The Folio
Society, 1991), 1:21.
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an effort to identify the cause of our evil-doing; Montaigne, for
instance, wrote in 1578:
If we wish to derive some advantage from this very fact,
that it is in our power to seize [animals], to use them and
do what we like with them, this is only the same
advantage that we have over one another. We have our
slaves upon this condition.'
Montaigne specifies unwarranted Pride as the basis of our need
for subordinating an other: "Presumption is our namral and
original malady. The most vulnerable and frail of all creatures,
and at the same time the most arrogant."'® Belfard recognizes
this same unfounded pride at the bottom of Lovelace's cruelty:
"What miserable yet conceited beings men in general, but we
libertines in particular, are" (2:1126) As Clarissa is told also
from Belford's and Clarissa's, as well as Lovelace's, points of
view, the reader has no trouble recognizing the delusion which
informs Lovelace's assertion of his superiority.
Like Montaigne, Jeremy Bentham in 1780 linked this human
tendency to subordination of other species to subordination of
his own in slavery:
The day has been, I grieve to say in many places it is not
yet past, in which the greater part of the species rmder
the denomination of slaves, have been treated by the law
exactly upon the same footing as, in England for example,
the inferior races of animals are still...The French have
already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no
reason why a human being should be abandoned without
redress to the caprice of a tormentor...What else is it that
should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of
' Michel de Monta^ne, "Apology for Raymond Sebond," The Complete Essays of
Montaigne, trans. Donald M. Frame (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965),
306-18, 337.
Montaigne, "Apology," 330.
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reason, or, perhaps, the factilty of discourse? But a fullgrown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more
rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an
infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But
suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? the
question is not Can they reason} nor. Can they talk} but.
Can they sufferT"^
Bentham locates the cause of httman cruelty in the "pleasures of
malevolence."'^
Through the bird-catching analogies Lovelace uses to exploit
his pursuit of Clarissa, Richardson demonstrates that his villain
possesses not only the inflated pride written of by Montaigne,
but also an epicurean appreciation of what Bentham calls the
"pleasures of malevolence":
We begin with birds as boys, and as men go on to ladies;
and both perhaps, in turns, experience our sportive
cruelty:
Hast thou not observed the charming gradations by
which the ensnared volatile has been brought to bear with
its new condition? How at first, refusing all sustenance,
it beats and bruises itself against its wires, till it makes its
gay plumage fly about, and overspread its well-secured
cage. Now it gets out its head: sticking for breath, and
erectedly perched. (1:557)
He continues to detail lovingly the miseries of the caged bird
through most of his letter. As Biggs points out:
Such images, with their stress on the baiting of a helpless
captive, give a whole new tone to the himting meta" Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1879), 311.
Bentham, Principles, 114.
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phors...we come to see vejty different concepts of
achievement and entertainment."

She rightly acknowledges that it is not "sport" or "challenge"
that Lovelace enjoys, but inflicting pain:
The "difficulty" Lovelace refers to as enjoyable is really
the spectacle of ineffectual struggle, as with the captive
bird...Any measure that shows Clarissa as a genuine con
tender, i.e. one with a chance of winning...throws liim
into a rage."
Marjorie Spiegel explains that modern psychologists
recognize that pleasure is the driving force behind the cruelties
of sexual offenders hke Lovelace and other persecutors: "No
matter how noble the oppressors claim to be, we must
remember that the infliction of pain and suffering becomes a
pleasurable act, an end in itself."" It is a vicious cycle we
imcover; hierarchy is achieved and maintained through exertion
of power over another; the exercise of power reinforces pride
in rank; the exercise of power is so pleasurable that it becomes
its own justification; and hierarchy is made necessary in order
to maintain the existence of an other who can be made to feel
this power: "To those who would be master, what matters is
not so much who their slaves will be, but that there are slaves
to be had.""
Belford is aware of the complex web of pride and pleasure in
subordination of the other that motivates Lovelace's persecution
of Clarissa:

" Biggs, 54.
" Biggs, 57.
" Marjorie Spiegel, The Dreaded Comparison: Human and Animal Slavery (New
York: Mirror Books, 1989), 90.
" Spiegel, 91.
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Proud and vain as the conceited wretch [Man] is of
fancied and self-dependent excellence, he is obHged not
only for the ornaments, but for the necessaries of life
(that is to say, for food as well as raiment) to all other
creatures; strutting with their blood and spirit in his
veins, and with their plumage on his back, for what has
he of his own, but a very mischievous, monkey-like, bad
nature? Yet thinks himself at liberty to kick, and cuff,
and elbow out every worthier creature: and when he has
none of the animal creation to himt down and abuse, will
make use of his power, his strength, or his wealth, to
oppress the less powerful and weaker of his own species.
(2:1125-26)
Belford, enabled by his empathy to see from the perspective of
the himted, calls Lovelace to account for his sadistic pleasures
by comparing Clarissa to a wounded deer:^^
Canst thou thyself say, on reflection, that it has not the
look of a wicked and hardened sportiveness in thee, for
the sake of a wanton humour only (since it can answer
no end that thou proposest to thyself, but the direct
contrary), to htmt from place to place a poor lady who,
like a harmless deer that has already a barbed shaft in her
breast, seeks only a refuge from thee in the shades of
death? (2:1224)
What is glorified as sport and challenge by Lovelace is shown
to be simply "the pleasures of malevolence" by Belford. Thus
does Richardson employ an estabUshed tradition of comparing
human cruelty toward people to human cruelty toward animals
" In "Of Cruelty," Montaigne suggests tliat with the aid of reason, "It is possible
to master the onset of this pleasure' in the hunt, whether the prey is animal or
woman. Michel de Montaigne, "Of Cruelty," The Complete Essays of Montaigne,
306-18, 313.
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in order to demonstrate that hierarchy, power, pride, and
pleasure are at the basis of numerous abuses.
Like Richardson, Samuel Johnson also angrily attacks the
Lovelace-like attitude of Soame Jenyns in his review of Jenyns's
"A Free Inquiry into the Nature and Origin of Evil" by
employing animal imagery to criticize a particular theory of
hierarchy, with the effect of undermining the very concept of
rank. Johnson expresses disbelief in the concept of cosmological hierarchy, which Jenyns (borrowing from Pope) uses to
justify sufiFering in the world: Johnson argues that the concept
of inferiority is subjective, constructed in the mind of the
beholder. He attempts to consider the point of view of the
other:
Pope might ask the weed why it was less than the oak,
but the weed would never ask the question for it
self...There is no evil but must inhere in a conscious
being, or be referred to it; that is, evil must be felt before
it is evil. (524)
As to Jenyns's saying that the Great Chain of Being is based
on the utility of lower-ranking creation for higher, that the
poor exist for the benefit of the wealthy, or animals for
humans, Johnson wants to know for whose benefit people were
made, for our existence seems to serve neither angels nor
animals:

It does not appear even to the imagination that of three
orders of being, the first and third receive any advantage
from the imperfection of the second, or that indeed they
may not equally exist, though the second had never been,
or should cease to be, and why should that be concluded
necessary which cannot be proved even to be useful.
(525)
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Johnson parodies this anthropocentric view of creation by
shifting perspectives in "The Vultures' View of Man," from
Idler No. 22, in which the vulture assumes that it is the center
of creation and that man was created for his uses because man
is "the only beast who kills that which he does not devour,"
providing the vulture with bounteous feasts after his wars.'^ Is
there a better explanation for the destruction of foxes and
women by a predator such as Lovelace?
Johnson particularly takes issue with Jenyns's complacency
and hardness of heart, for Jenyns writes that evil is inherent in
the subordination that he believes characterizes creation:
these real evils proceed from the same source as those
imaginary ones of imperfection before treated of, namely,
from that subordination without which no created system
can subsist; all subordination implying imperfection, all
imperfection evil, and all evil some kind of inconveniency
or suffering: so that there must be particular inconveniencies and sufferings annexed to every particular rank of
created beings by circumstances of things, and their
modes of existence. (530)
Even Pope, from whom, Johnson tells us, Jenyns plagiarized his
ideas, advocated compassion toward those he considered lesser
beings, not contempt:
I caimot think it extravagant to imagine, that Mankind
are no less in Proportion, accountable for the ill use of
their Dominion over Creatures of the lower Rank of
Beings, than for the Exercise of Tyranny over their own
Species, especially because there is no "Recompence" in
the next world for their suffering."
" Johnson, "The Vultures' View of Man," Samuel Johnson, ed. Donald Greene
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984): 282-4.
" Alexander Pope, "Against Barbarity to Animals" in Selected Prose of Alexander
Pope, ed. Paul Hammond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987): 46.
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Pope goes so far as to say that we have obligations toward
"inferior" creatures:
It is certainly the part of a well-natured Man to take care
of his Horses and Dogs, not only in expectation of their
Labour while they are Foals and Whelps, but even when
their old Age has made them incapable of Serviced®
Jenyns, however, beheves that suffering carries its own
compensation:
Poverty, or the want of riches, is generally compensated
by having more hopes and fewer fears...Ignorance, or the
want of knowledge and hterature, the appointed lot of all
born to poverty and the drudgeries of life, is the only
opiate capable of infusing that sensibility which can
enable them to endure...It is a cordial administered by the
gracious hand of providence, of which they ought never
to be deprived by an ill-judged and improper education.
(527)
Johnson counters that poverty is "want of competence" and "of
necessaries," and that the poor are more likely to be "despon
dent" than hopeful, their insensibility to lesser worries
accounted for by their greater pain (527). He asks how we are
to recognize those "born to poverty," those whose lot would be
made harder by education (529). How can one determine any
individual creature's place in the scale of creation.^
Johnson advocates intellectual htunility and humane charity
instead of Jenyns's pride of place in the Great Chain of Being:
This doctrine of the regular subordination of beings, the
scale of existence, and the chain of nature I have often
' Pope, 48.
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considered, but I always left the inquiry in doubt and
uncertainty. (525)
The most important question of why God created imperfect
beings is one "we shall never be able to discern" (525):
I would advise Qenyns] a little to distrust his own
faculties...Subordination in human affairs is well under
stood, but when it is attributed to the universal system,
its meaning grows less certain, like the petty distinctions
of locality, which are of good use upon our own globe,
but have no meaning with regard to infinite space, in
which nothing is high or low. (531)
Johnson identifies in Jenyns the same unwarranted pride and
sadistic pleasure in the exercise of power which Richardson
associates with Lovelace:
I am always afraid of determining on the side of envy or
cruelty. The privileges of education may sometimes be
improperly bestowed, but I shall always fear to withold
them, lest I shotild be yielding to the suggestions of pride,
while I persuade myself that I am following the maxims
of policy; and imder the appearance of salutary restraints,
should be indulging the lust of dominion, and that
malevolence which delights in seeing othen depressed.
(529)
Although (according to the OED) "sadism" was not incorpo
rated into our vocabulary tmtil 1888, Johnson and Richardson
exhibit an tmderstanding of the concept and its relation to the
oppression of another. Johnson, Hke Richardson, exposes the
complex relationship of hierarchy, pride, and pleasure in the
exercise of power as the source of human evd.
Johnson attacks all these by employing vivisection imagery
in the way Richardson employs hvmting and trapping imag-
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ery—to give the point of view of the oppressed other and to
destroy all "ennobling" theoretical justifications of hierarchy.
Jenyns
imagines that as we have not only animals for food, but
choose some for our diversion, the same privilege may be
allowed to some beings above us, who may deceive,
torment, or destroy us for doe ends only of their own pleasure
or utility. (534-5)
Wayne Schmalz writes that the danger Johnson sees in Jenyns's
logic is that "it could be used to condone evil acts in the name
of good and provide an excuse for maintaining present
inequalities,"^' which is certainly true, but Schmalz overlooks
some of the implications. He explains that
By linking "elegance" with "swelling" Johnson creates a
complex series of interactions between Jenyns and the
poor, which gives the impression that Jenyns is in some
way responsible for reducing them to the level of
animals.^^
Johnson, however, criticizes Jenyns not for "reducing [the poor]
to the level of animals," but rather for defending the very
notion of hierarchy in creation which Schmalz takes for
granted. Johnson imagines all the abuse we inflict upon animals
turned upon ourselves in the passage Schmalz discusses:
He might have shown that these hunters, whose game is
man have many sports analogous to our own. As we
drown whelps and kittens, they amuse themselves now
and then with sinking a ship, and stand round the fields
Wayne Schmalz, "Samuel Johnson's 'Soame Jenyns Review';
Experienced," Wascana Review (1983); 40-55, 42.
Schmalz, 53.

The World
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of Blenheim, or the walls of Prague, as we encircle a
cockpit...Some of them, perhaps, are virtuosi, and delight
in the operation of an asthma, as a human philosopher in
the effects of the air pump. To swell a man with
tympany is as good sport as to blow a frog. Many a
merry bout have these frolic beings at the vicissitudes of
an ague. (535)
The effect of this passage is to create contempt for the creature
(the himter/vivisector) who considers that he has a right to the
use of other creatures for his pleasure, as well as to engender
compassionate identification with his victim. Johnson regards
these "superior" beings who use us for their pleasure as sadistic,
and the suggestion is that we in whose image Johnson's fanciful
creatures are made are also sadistic.^^
Thus, Johnson's animal imagery expresses doubt about how
well "subordination in htiman affairs" is understood. Once
those accustomed to considering themselves higher on the chain
of being are subjected to oppression by others who consider
themselves even higher, their natural response is to question the
standards that determine rank, and even the concept of rank
" In "The State of Affairs in Lflliput," from the Gentleman's Magazine, Johnson
wrote in the Swiftian mode of virtuous outsider astounded by European barbarity:
the people of the Lilliputian Empiie in Degulia
have made conquests and settled colonies in very distant regions, the
inhabitants of which they look upon as barbarous, though in simplicity of
manners, probity, and temperance superior to themselves; and seem to
think that they have a right to treat them as passion, interest, or caprice
shall direa, without much regard to the rules of justice or humanity...If
you endeavor to examine the foundation of this authority, they neither
produce any grant from a superior of jurisdiaion, nor plead the consent
of the people whom they govern in this tyrannical manner; but either
threaten you with punishment for abridging the Emperor's sovereignty, or
tell you in positive terms that Power is right. (47)
See Samuel Johnson, "The State of Affairs in Lilliput," Samuel Johnson, ed. Donald
Greene: (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 44-50, 47.
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itself. Under what conditions would "superior" beings rank
higher than the highest of the human race? And, having met
those conditions and been acknowledged higher, what rights
would they have over us as a perquisite of their rank? It is
painful to imagine ourselves in the situation of being obliged to
rely on the noblesse oblige of Johnson's visionary creatures; it is,
however, somewhat less taxing to rationalize our own exertion
of power, both benevolent and cruel, over members of our own
and other species labelled "inferior" by those who have
constructed and who perpetuate hierarchical notions of
creation. Johnson's superior beings are "wiser and more
powerful than we" (535) but it is evident in his discussion of the
uses to which they put their superior endowments that greater
intelligence and power do not imply an inherent right of
dominion. In this work, as in Clarissa, "superiority" is often an
excuse for the infliction of pain, softened by euphemisms such
as "duty" and "natural authority," euphemisms constantly
recurring in discussions of hierarchical relationships, whether in
the family or the state, or between genders or species. Johnson
asserts that "humble acquiescence and fervent adoration" (534)
are the right uses of reason, but preoccupation with how high
we rank in an anthropocentric world is not conducive to
humility.
Richardson, Johnson, and other eighteenth-century writers
(notably Swift^'' and Voltaire^^) began the work of tearing down
In Gulliver's Travels, Swift's protagonist sees projectors blowing up dogs with
bellows (as did the "virtuosi" of Johnson, mentioned above) (155); remarks on the
English mistreatment of horses in Houyhnhnmland (208); and voices fear of the
Brobdingnagians treating him as animals are treated in England—"I apprehended
every moment that he would dash me against the Ground, as we usually do any
little hatefid Animal which we have a mind to destroy (67). Gulliver's experience
of seeing from different perspeaives leads him to wonder, "And who knows but
that even this prodigious Race of Mortals might be equally overmatched in some
distant Part of the World, whereof we have yet no discovery?" (67). The
Brobdingnagian king, having heard catalog of human evils great and small,
recognizes the disparity between our worth and our pride; "I cannot but conclude
the Bulk of your Natives, to be the most pernicious Race of little odious Vermin
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the Great Chain of Being, opening the way for compassion as
the basis for relationships, rather than hierarchy, inviting us to
admit that we find pleasure in oppressing others in order that
we might rehabilitate our warped sensibilities. Boswell,
accentuating Johnson's gentle kindliness, describes his love of
children, servants, and animals (all traditionally considered
beings inferior to the adult, white, middle-class European male)
in three paragraphs, among which can be found the anecdote
about Johnson's care personally to procure oysters for his cat,
that Nature ever sufiE^eied to crawl upon the Surface of the Earth" (108). See
Jonathan Swift, Gulliver's Travels in The Writings of Jonathan Swift, ed. Robert A.
Gieenberg and William B. Piper (New York; Norton, 1973): 1-260.
In his Philosophical Dictionary Voltaire writes under "Animals" that philosophers
are presumptuous who assert the inferiority of the souls of animals, for xhey have
no evidence for such conclusions. See Voltaire, "Animals," in Philosophical
Dictionary, trans. A. I. Woolf (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, n.d.), 22-3. He takes
issue with the assertion that because animals have not speech th^ also have not
feeling:
Is it because I speak to you that }rou judge that I have feeling, memory,
ideas? Well, I do not speak to you; you see me going home looking
disconsolate, seeking a paper anxiously, opening the desk where I
remember having shut it, finding it, reading it joyfully. You judge that I
have experienced the feeling of distress and that of pleasure, that I have
memory and understanding.
Bring the same ju<^ment to bear on this dog which has lost its master,
which has sought him on every road with sorrowful cries, which enters the
house agitated, uneasy, which goes down the stairs, up the stairs, from
room to room, which at last finds in his study the master it loves, and
which shows him its joy by its cries of delight, by its leaps, by its caresses.
In the philosophical tale "Micromegas," Voltaire's two morally, intelleaually,
and physically gigantic interplanetary travellers light upon Earth, discover that
people are overly proud, and are informed by the Earthlings "that their persons
[the travellers'], their worlds, their suns, their stars, everything was made solely for
man" (168). After laughing a while, "The Sirian picked up the little mites again;
he still spoke to them with much kindness, although at the bottom of his heart he
was a little bit angry to see that infinitely small creatures should have a pride
almost infinitely great" (168). See Voltaire, "Micromegas," in Candide and Selected
Stories, trans. Donald M. Frame (New York: International Collectors Library,
1969), 152-68.
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Hodge, lest the servants feel put upon and treat Hodge badly7^
Johnson's concern for Hodge demonstrates his understanding
of the human pleasure in the exercise of power over subordi
nates. But it also exemplifies the wondrous possibilities of a
value system based upon humility rather than pride. Of course,
neither Johnson nor Richardson was a radical leveller,
democrat, nor animal rights activist; yet the animal metaphors
abounding in theirs and in much eighteenth-century writing
about hmnan relationships reveals a pervasive and discomfiting
tmcertainty about what it means to be human, about relation
ships between people, and about relationships between species.
The logic of their metaphors leads to the conclusion that there
are much more humane perspectives than philosophies based
upon hierarchy.
James Boswell, Life of Johnson, ed. R. W. Chapman (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1970), 1216-17.

